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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we address the problem of defining games formally, 
following Wittgenstein's dictum that games cannot be defined 
adequately as a formal category. Several influential attempts at 
definitions will be evaluated and shown to be inadequate. As an 
alternative, we propose a descriptive model of the definable super-
category that games belong to, cybermedia, that is pragmatic, 
open, and capable of meeting the needs of the diverse, intensely 
interdisciplinary field of game studies for a uniting conceptual-
lization of its main phenomenon. Our approach, the Cybermedia 
model, consisting of Player, Sign, Mechanical System, and 
Material Medium, offers a medium-independent, flexible and 
analytically useful way to contrast different approaches in games 
research and to determine which aspect of the phenomenon one is 
talking about when the word ‘game’ is used. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: There is no Tetris 
In what sense can a game be said to exist? What is brought into 
being when a game is being played, and disappears again after it 
is finished? Can the activity of playing a game be identified 
objectively? In a movie where two actors are shown as playing 
chess, is it possible to determine whether they are really playing 
or merely pretending to play? And what does it mean to play the 
same game as another person? Is it enough to believe that one is 
doing so? In short, what are the parameters by which we 
determine if a particular game is being played? If we design a 
game that no-one has played yet, does it exist already, or must we 
wait for someone to play it to bring it into existence? 
When two players are playing chess, everyone present will 
assume that they are playing the same game. However, if they can 
be shown to have different notions of what the rules are, while 
being unaware of this discrepancy, are they still playing the same 
game? In that case, if we depend on rules to determine the identity 
of a game, it would be easy to show that they are not playing the 
same game, as the two diverging rule-conceptualizations would 
constitute two different games. Given the complexity of many 
games, it is not uncommon for players to discover that their 
opponents have different conceptualizations than themselves. In 
such cases, must we conclude that two games are coexisting in the 
same socio-physical space? Or that one game can exist even if 
there are two or more conceptualizations of it? 
These questions call into doubt the exact nature of the game 
phenomenon. The things we call games typically go through 
changes during their lifetime, and still we identify them by their 
names. World of Warcraft has changed many times since its first 
release in 2004, and yet it is normal to think of it as one game. 
However, one can also find former players who stopped playing 
when certain aspects of the game was changed. For them, WoW is 
no longer the same game, and so they subsequently stopped 
playing it. For one group of people then, WoW is is still the same 
game, for others it is not. Thus, we cannot use the materiality of 
the game to determine whether it is the same, but rather realise 
that the game primarily exists as a mental construct, which may be 
different for different people. From this perspective, games are 
ideal objects (Aarseth 2011: 65), which may or may not 
completely overlap between players. 
This is also the case on a material level. The game we call Tetris 
(originally designed and implemented by Alexey Pajitnov in 
1984) is no longer one game in a material sense, since it exists in 
many implementations and with a number of slightly different 
rule sets.  Games like Paintball and Marbles, on the other hand, 
are identified primarily through their materiality, as they have rule 
sets that vary significantly across cultures and player 
communities.  
As Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out, concepts like “game” 
(“Spiel”) are analytically indefinable; any formal definition will 
only frame a subset of the total set of phenomena people refer to 
as “games”. For Wittgenstein this observation was merely a useful 
example for his argument about language and meaning, but for the 
organized study of games it becomes another kind of problem: If 
we cannot formally define our object of study we run the risk of 
“merely verbal disagreement” (Næss, 1966) when making claims 
about what games are and how they function. A merely verbal 
disagreement exists when two debaters believe they disagree but 
in reality are using the same term in two different senses. It should 
not matter to us that Wittgenstein himself was not invested in the 
study of games or what his real intensions might have been; his 
words remain a challenge to those who would define games, and 
an inspiration for those who agree with his critical observation 
that games is not a formally definable category. 
A close reading of central debates that have risen within game 
studies gives ample indication that such a problem already exists. 
When we talk of “games” we are often covering an extensive 




little in common with each other aside from their expected role of 
inducing entertainment. 
One solution is to dismiss Wittgenstein and simply propose a 
definition. But until now, this approach seems to have created 
more problems than solutions, as it (just as Wittgenstein 
predicted) will lead to an arbitrarily defined subset of games, 
rather than of all games. Juul (2005) and Salen & Zimmerman 
(2003) point out the limits of their own definitions by referring to 
games such as Sim City (Juul, 2005, 47) and pen and paper role-
playing games (Juul, 2005, 44; Salen & Zimmerman, 2003, 81) 
that by their models are rendered “borderline” or “limit cases”. 
Any definition that marginalizes such central examples of games 
can only be seen to exemplify Wittgenstein's argument. “Game” 
(Spiel, Jeu, Ludus, etc.) is a label that always referred to many 
different practices, and it would be less than wise to ignore this 
when setting up or participating in a broad, interdisciplinary 
research field such as game studies. It is thus important to 
acknowledge that the term “game” works well in a nominal, not a 
theoretical sense. It is unwise to confuse the two, as this inevitably 
leads to an arbitrary imposition of meaning rather than an 
analytically accurate scrutiny of the object in question. Nominal 
labels must be accepted as vague, partial to popular 
understanding, and sometimes self-contradictory. In addition, the 
formal understanding of games suffers from a hermeneutic 
challenge related to the experiential dimension of game-play: two 
players of the same game might not agree on what the game is. 
Each can have a legitimately different view on what they are 
playing without altering the formal features of the game as object. 
Typically, games are played in ways that challenge the conception 
of the rules that any particular player may have, and so the notion 
of “what the game is” can always be contested (and typically is) 
despite the fact that concrete rules may exist. 
2. VARIETY OF GAMES 
Games are too often discussed as a homogenous category of 
objects in the world we can readily make blanket statements about 
(e.g. “a medium,” cf Wolf 2001, Murray 2004). Games have 
historically included bloody, mass-audience spectacles and 
dangerous chariot races, as well as back-room or parlour 
entertainment, gambling, children’s play activities, military 
training exercises and business simulations.  But even if we 
address only digital games (games that rely on digital 
components) or video games (games that are displayed on an 
electronic screen), it is dangerously unfocused to address them all 
as belonging to one and the same medium. An arcade machine 
from the early 1970s or a handheld, battery-powered Gameboy 
from the late 1980s are not the same media as the Internet.  The 
wide diversity of material, communicative, social and aesthetic 
practices (from Nintendo’s 1980 gadget Game&Watch to 
Blizzard’s 2004 World of Warcraft) can only suggest that we are 
dealing with a huge flora of media, some standalone, some 
mobile, some net-based, with highly diverse content structures 
and uses.   
The word “game” covers content types and practices that we will 
find in other media that are not traditionally or intuitively 
considered games, such as film, music, literature and visual art, or 
conversations, letter writing and socializing. Thus, the piece of 
software that is tagged with the label “game” is often more than a 
game (Aarseth 2012). Although we, for ease of reference, call 
Grand Theft Auto IV a game, it would be more accurate to 
consider it as a virtual environment that simulates a city having a 
number of games embedded in it and a few linear storylines that 
players can progress through by completing sequences of game-
like activities. When two players meet in GTA IV’s Liberty City 
they can engage in pre-packaged games that have been coded into 
the system or they can decide to create their own games within the 
virtual playground in multiplayer free mode. The rules of the 
game they play are thus either upheld by the code or agreed upon 
socially (as is the case with non-digital games). Our players may 
also decide to cruise the city and chat. In the latter case it would 
be more accurate to consider the interaction as a shared activity in 
a virtual environment rather than a game. This means that not all 
interactions with the objects we call games (or objects within 
these) result in game-like activities. All these activities already 
have labels unrelated to games and play, e.g. listening to music, 
looking at art, chatting, etc. Only their taking place via a type of 
networking software that bears the label ‘game’ seems to account 
for the (rather curious) categorization of these activities as ludic. 
The solution adopted in this paper is to accept Wittgenstein's 
doctrine, and acknowledge that the phenomenon of games is not a 
formally definable set but a historically constructed notion. 
Instead of a definition we propose to move to a conceptual meta-
level, which addresses what it means to define games in a certain 
way, and how the concept of games can still be used (and more 
fruitfully so) as the unifying concept of a field of study. With 
regards to computer games we aim to distinguish the composite 
entertainment product generally referred to as game (game as 
object) from the socially negotiated activity such objects can 
support (game as process). The main aim of this paper is thus to 
provide a model of ludic entities and processes which will 
circumvent the confinement of games to a priori definitions. In so 
doing we hope to engage both those theorists who insist on the 
value of definitions and those who reject them as formalist 
devices that ignore the situated practice of gaming. In particular, 
we will argue that "game" has come to denote several different, 
yet equally valid concepts and that all these should be identified 
and acknowledged by the practitioners in the field. 
3. GAME DEFINITIONS 
As a new academic field is assembled, it is only natural that some 
degree of energy is spent on trying to define its main objects. In 
some cases such definitions are highly necessary; in others, they 
are less so. In literary studies, which have been around for more 
than two millennia, there is no consensus about what literature 
actually is, nor is this lack of consensus a cause of worry. In 
media studies, a much younger field, there is not one canonical 
definition of what a medium is.  This does not hinder the 
productive evolution of the field. But at some moments in the 
establishing of new fields, discussions of how best to define the 
object of study tend to manifest. Game definitions have been 
addressed in game studies since the inception of the field. A 
contributing factor to the need for defining games in the early 
days of game studies was the (erroneously labeled) “narratology 
vs. ludology” debate.  The disagreements in this discussion were 
more readily attributable to disciplinary interests and merely 
verbal disagreements than to the nature of games per se.  An 
outcome of this all-too-often misunderstood and misquoted debate 
(see Aarseth 2013) was the need for game theorists to define the 
phenomena under scrutiny. 
To date, the most quoted game definitions have been made by 
Jesper Juul in Half-Real (2005) and Katie Salen and Eric 
Zimmerman (2003) in Rules of Play: Game Design 
Fundamentals.  They both build them by reviewing and 
combining elements from a series of existing definitions of games 
found both in contemporary game studies and also in classical 
works on play and games such as Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens 
(1955) and Roger Caillois’ Man, Play and Games (1961).  The 
former thinker is particularly prominent in the work of Juul, Salen 
and Zimmerman.  We will go over the constituent parts of each of 
the two definitions and then consider their respective utility for 
understanding and defining games. 
Salen and Zimmerman define games as follows: “A game is a 
system in which players engage in an artificial conflict, defined by 
rules, that results in a quantifiable outcome” (p. 80).  They isolate 
six elements: system, players, artificiality, conflict, rules and 
quantifiable outcomes.  According to Salen and Zimmerman, all 
games are intrinsically systems (p. 50).  They define a system as 
“a set of things that affect one another within an environment to 
form a larger pattern that is different from any of the individual 
parts” (p. 50).  Players are a crucial constituent of the game, 
which is experienced by acting within its system.  The third 
element, the artificial aspect of games, refers to a mode of 
experience different from everyday life.  This is related to the 
notion of the “magic circle” mentioned by Huizinga (1955) in 
Homo Ludens.  The fourth element is conflict; “all games embody 
a contest of powers” (80).  Conflict encompasses both competition 
and collaboration with other players as well as conflict with a 
game system (such as the case in solo games).  Rules are seen as 
being essential to games enabling play through defining what 
players can and cannot do.  A quantifiable outcome or goal means 
that at the end of a game a player has either won, lost or at least 
received some sort of numerical score.  
Juul adds to Salen and Zimmerman’s definition through a model 
for defining games which he calls “the classic game model” (Juul, 
2005, p. 22).  His aim is to create a definition that applies both to 
non-digital and digital games and in so doing show the 
relationship between them. 
A game is a rule-based system with a variable and quantifi-
able outcome, where different outcomes are assigned different 
values, the player exerts effort in order to influence the out-
come, the player feels emotionally attached to the outcome, 
and the consequences of the activity are negotiable (p. 36). 
This definition is built on six constituent elements: Rules, variable 
and quantifiable outcome, valorisation of outcome, player effort, 
player attachment to outcome and negotiable consequences.  Juul 
argues that because rules can be computed by a machine or 
enforced by human participants, they are the common factor 
linking digital and non-digital games.   In his account, the rules 
constitute the system of relations which is the game, and these 
rules are independent of the media by which effect is given to the 
rules.  Rules also create the possibility of a variable and 
quantifiable outcome.  This refers to a definitive state of affairs 
which is objectively final at the end of the game and is valorised 
by the players involved.  Some of the possible outcomes are 
objectively better than others and therefore harder to obtain, and 
these valued outcomes are a result of player effort.  The rules of 
the game define which player actions can influence the state of the 
game and thus its outcome. Therefore, the player has to invest 
some amount of effort for the game to actually occur.  This effort 
will tend to result in an attachment to the outcome of the game.  
Winning is favoured over losing and yields more pleasure.  Juul 
states that this element of the definition is less formal than the 
others and is dependent on the player’s attitude.  Finally the 
consequences of the game are negotiable.  Games can therefore be 
optionally assigned consequences that reach beyond the domain of 
the game.  Juul adds a proviso for this element of his definition by 
saying that the consequences can be varied per game session. 
One does not have to look very far into these definitions to find 
examples of artefacts we call games that are not satisfied by their 
essentialist characteristics.  Let’s take a characteristic they both 
have in common: quantifiable outcomes.  While both definitions 
can be comfortably applied to what James Carse (1986) has 
labeled “finite games”: games that have a specific start and an end 
agreed upon by all players involved, this is only a limited subset 
of games, digital and otherwise.  Infinite games, Carse explains, 
do not have a clear beginning or end, and thus no outcome to be 
quantified.  Infinite games are about engagement in gameplay, not 
about a definitive outcome.  Both Juul and Salen and Zimmerman 
discuss borderline cases that do not fit their definitions, but they 
refer to these as anomalies to a norm.  But as Carse rightly points 
out, these are just two, broad types of games.  Furthermore, Carse 
was considering non-digital games.  When digital games are 
brought into the picture the existence of quantifiable outcomes 
becomes even more problematic, as the examples of infinite 
games are even more widespread.  MUDs, MMOGs, multiplayer 
social games like Farmville or Mafia Wars, simulation games like 
The Sims, sandbox games like Minecraft and many more are 
examples of infinite games without quantifiable outcomes.  And 
most narrative-based games that do have a start and end, cannot 
be said to have a “quantifiable” outcome.  They end because the 
scripted narrative (Calleja, 2011) or spatial trajectory they chart 
comes to a close, but this is not really a form of quantified 
outcome, as much as a narrative device borrowed from century-
old traditions in story-telling across media.  Then there are games 
which blend the latter with the former: open worlds with an 
optional scripted narrative story line one can engage with or avoid 
as they please.  Games like Skyrim, Fallout and the Grand Theft 
Auto series have a start and end to their scripted narrative lines, 
but they do not have an overall quantifiable outcome.  This single 
central defining element found in both definitions removes a large 
portion of games from being viewed as such, making the 
definitions questionable, at least as an overarching definition 
accounting for all games.    
If we consider rules, another characteristic found in both 
definitions that is commonly taken for granted as a defining 
element of games, we also run across definitional difficulties.  As 
Gregersen (2005) points out, a “rule” is not a homogenous and 
straight-forward concept, but conceals a number of disparate 
elements, such as measures of success, descriptions of spatial, 
temporal and material arrangements, the existence of natural or 
simulated laws (one cannot have a football world championship 
take place on the Moon, for gravitational reasons) emergency 
procedures and so on. 
How do we account for a digital game that has several, different 
sets of rules depending on the specific activity we are engaging 
with at that particular time?  We are here referring to games like 
Grand Theft Auto IV which has a sprawling environment with 
overarching rules implemented and then other sub-games with 
their own rule-sets one can play on their own or with others such 
as darts or billiards.  The rule-sets of the latter examples only take 
effect when engaging with the sub-games and have no bearing on 
the rest of the game experience. Do we thus have one or several 
games in one?  What about games that have a single player 
campaign and a multiplayer mode with several different game 
modes, each of these with their own rule-sets?  How do we apply 
a definition that has as its corner-stone a specific rule-based 
system to games that have multiple rule systems implemented in 
them, and, to make matters more complicated, provide rule-
systems that are conflicting within the same space and time?  
Let’s take a game of Call of Duty IV (Infinity Ward, 2007) as an 
example. Let’s say we are playing a conventional round of 
multiplayer deathmatch; trying to help our team score as many 
kills as possible while not giving away kills to the enemy.  What 
we just described is the specific rule system we are presented with 
when we play a round of team deathmatch.  But another rule 
system that Call of Duty presents us with across all multiplayer 
modes is the achievement system. In order for us to be 
competitive at the various game modes we need to level up our 
characters and use “perks” (abilities) and upgrade our weapons 
through the accumulation of XP.  XP is accumulated from 
fulfilling game objectives, killing players and, more importantly, 
by fulfilling various goals set by the game called achievements.  
These yield a far greater lump of XP than can be accumulated by 
simply fulfilling mission goals and killing players (ie interacting 
with the individual rule-system of the respective game-mode). But 
these goals often conflict with those set by the individual game 
session’s rule-system.  In this case, for example, somebody else 
on our team is playing a different game: they are trying to kill an 
opponent while falling off the highest building on the map.  The 
goals of the suicidal player are not only different, but 
contradictory to ours.  So although we are all playing the same 
multiplayer mode type on the same map, the suicidal player is 
playing a different game than us. Our rule sets and quantifiable 
outcomes are different and thus it would be logical to argue that 
we are, in fact, playing different games within the same game 
environment.  Neither Juul nor Salen and Zimmerman’s game 
definitions allow for this, altogether common situation in games.   
Furthermore, games without formal rules do exist, and in some 
cases it is unclear whether rules exist or not. For instance, puzzles 
and riddles, usually seen and labeled as ludic forms, do contain 
goals (i.e. solving them) but often they do not come with explicit 
rules for use. For example, an amusement park labyrinth can be 
played without the use of explicit rules. Because the means and 
goals are clear, rules are not needed. In roleplaying games, the 
behavior of the game master need not be bound by explicit rules, 
nor does the computer game necessarily have to follow specific 
game rules in their execution. Exceptions and special cases can be 
invoked in ways opaque to the player, and nothing is stopping 
such programs from cheating, that is, irregularly departing from 
the rules the player has come to expect. One such example is “the 
last bullet”, a situation in some first person shooters where the 
player, facing a powerful monster and with only one round of 
ammunition left, is able to kill it with only one shot, something it 
is not normally possible to do. This is not the same as the fact that 
computer games contain rules that are opaque and hidden from the 
players, but that even these inferred rules can be skipped in 
situations when the player has every reason to expect them. 
The above challenges with the existing definitions begs the 
question: are these definitions flawed or are they symptomatic of a 
broader problem with defining games?  It is not at all clear that a 
game definition, even if possible, is needed for the continued 
healthy existence of the field of game studies. Perhaps it would 
even be, to some extent, detrimental to it if a common definition 
could be agreed upon, because this could mean that the field is 
closed off from useful future expansions, and also from many 
types of current phenomena that enriches and informs much of the 
field’s practice. As important as definitions generally are, it is just 
as important to recognize which terms and concepts can and 
cannot be formally defined, and also which consequences the 
definitional act will have. This problem of unresolved definitions 
can be found in all academic fields, including the natural sciences. 
Pluto was until recently a planet, but lost its status by simple vote 
when a definition of 'planet' was elected that excluded it. As this 
did not go down well with fans of the former planet, a search 
immediately began for a definition that would reinstate Pluto to 
planethood. As planets until that moment had not been subjected 
to rigorous scientific definitions, we can observe how the act of 
scientific terminologizing carries a high political significance, 
even in a field such as astronomy. Changing the definition again 
to include Pluto could have unforeseen side effects, such as 
bestowing planetary status upon the Earth's Moon (Battersby 
2009). 
As a nominal category, games are activities and objects that are 
constantly morphing and expanding.  The challenge posed to 
game theorists is to either come up with a definition that 
invariably omits a good portion of these activities and objects 
from being games or to accept that no definition is possible.  
These two positions are well represented in philosophy by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s argument for the undefinability of games and the 
critique thereof provided by Bernard Suits. 
4. WITTGENSTEIN VS. SUITS  
Sixty-two years have passed since the publication of 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953), wherein he 
pointed out that the phenomena we think of as “games” could not 
be subsumed under a formal definition.  Juul misunderstands the 
nature of Wittgenstein's position when he addresses this challenge 
in a footnote (2003): 
As Bernard Suits points out (Suits 1978, p.x), the suggestion 
that we should look and see whether there are commonalities 
to games is a good one, but it is unfortunately not really an 
advice that Wittgenstein himself follows. 
Wittgenstein bestows the burden of finding commonalities upon 
those, like Juul and Suits, who would claim that these 
commonalities must exist, which is exactly the opposite of 
Wittgenstein's position. Wittgenstein merely assumes a null-
hypothesis, that no commonalities exist, and therefore he does not 
have anything to prove, since a negative cannot be proven.  
Bernard Suits took up this challenge in his work: The 
Grasshopper: Game, Life and Utopia (1978).  Suits criticizes 
Wittgenstein’s claim of games’ undefinability by arguing that 
Wittgenstein is guilty of not following his own advice to “look 
and see whether there is anything common to all” (Wittgenstein in 
Suits, 21); that is, of not actually analysing games enough to find 
their defining characteristics.  In response Suits delivers a book-
length defence of his definition of games: 
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of 
affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by rules 
[lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient 
in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and 
where the rules are accepted just because they make possible 
such activity [lusory attitude].  (54-55) 
However, Suits is here not defining an attitude as such, but rather 
the operational mode of accepting and following rules. One can 
agree to follow rules for a number of reasons and with a number 
of attitudes. Also, a number of activities, such as doing a school 
exam without cheating, would satisfy Suits’ description, while 
clearly not being a game.  
While a valiant attempt at a definition, Suits misses the central 
point of Wittgenstein’s reason for using games as examples, par 
excellence, of undefinable phenomena: the category of activities 
and objects that are productively called games evolve and expand 
in ways that no static, essentialist definition can ever hope to 
cover.  All we can ever manage is to define a subset of the broad 
family of games. The advent of digital games, for example, 
severely challenges several characteristics of Suits’ definition.  
Although digital games existed at the time of Suits’ definition, it 
is understandable he did not cover them as they were still quite 
culturally marginal. So before we go into the difficulties that 
digital games create for Suits’ definition, let us first consider his 
definition in relation to the games more widely available at the 
time of writing. 
Like Juul, and Salen and Zimmerman, his definition has, as one of 
its central characteristics, and one which Suits emphasizes as 
crucial, a single goal that determines the completion of the game: 
“the achievement of a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal]”.  
Suits describes three kinds of goals: the overall goal of the 
activity, which he labels the prelusory goal, the achievement of 
the prelusory goal by adherence to the rules (that is, winning the 
game) and the goal of generally participating in the game. 
Out of these three Suits argues for the primacy of the prelusory 
goal, since the other two presuppose it but it does not pre-suppose 
the others.  Suits rightly points out that the goals and rules are 
inseparable: we cannot achieve the second form of goal, the win, 
without reaching the prelusory goal through adherence with rules. 
For Suits, not following rules simply means you are not playing a 
game.  As we have argued above, however, this emphasis on a 
definite outcome or goal à la Salen, Zimmerman and Juul, leaves 
out all games that Carse has identified as infinite. Of course we 
can say that these are not actually games at all, but then we are 
hard pressed to pin down what they actually are. Suits defends 
himself against the critique that some things he has called games 
are not always called games, such as races, by arguing that games 
are the category of objects that best describes races as there is no 
other category of objects that better describes them and thus he is 
justified in placing them under the game subset.  What Suits does 
not do, is go through all, or at least some, of the games that do not 
have a stipulated goal and make a case for them being more 
readily fitting some other category of ontological objects. The 
only example from these open-ended games he does comment 
upon is Ring Around the Rosie, which he feels is better described 
as a theatrical performance rather than a game. But when was it 
ever performed in a theatre? 
Suits explains that his method of data collection to establish his 
definition involved settling on a number of games that he calls 
“hard core games” (164) which, in his words “if members of this 
group are not games, then nothing is. In this category I included 
places, bridge, baseball, golf, hockey, chess and Monopoly – 
things everyone calls games” (164).  The problem here, of course, 
is that this list of hard core games is entirely culturally specific, if 
not entirely subjective. But even if we stick to this criterion, that 
of games which are generally considered to be such by the 
majority of people in Western culture at a specific historical point, 
the advent of Dungeons and Dragons occurred 4 years before the 
publication of Suits’ definition, and by the time of Suits’ writing, 
it had become a widespread phenomenon, closely followed by its 
digital offspring: MUD in 1978.  The existence of, and the table-
top wargame legacy behind Dungeons and Dragons meant that it 
is intensely rule-based but utterly open-ended.  It would be hardly 
logical to apply Suits’ evasive tactic of claiming that this was not 
a game, since it is a thing everyone calls a game. 
The advent of D&D and digital games not only explodes this 
category of rule-based things that have no specific goal into such 
a multitude of game genres that it becomes impossible to claim 
that all such things are not games, but it also undermines Suits’ 
other core characteristic of games: the lusory attitude. 
The lusory attitude is the mode of experience into which a player 
enters when they engage with and abide by a game’s rules: 
The attitude of the game player must be an element in game 
playing because there has to be an explanation of that curious 
state of affairs wherein one adopts rules which require one to 
employ worse rather than better means to reach an end (p. 52). 
The voluntary decision to follow an inefficient course of action in 
order to play by the rules only applies to the socially negotiated 
aspect of digital games yet the majority of actions possible in 
digital games are programmed into the game system and cannot 
be changed.  To stick to Suits’ own example, if in physical golf 
we can use more efficient means to grab the golf ball by hand and 
place it in the hole, in the digital version of golf we cannot do this. 
We simply do not have at our disposal anything but what Suits 
calls the “inefficient means” to perform our chosen task.  To bring 
another example, one cannot decide to ignore the rules written 
into a game like Fable II (Lionhead Studios, 2008) and, for 
example, drag a chair found in one’s house to the town square and 
decide to sit there.  The game does not allow for this to take place 
because the actions are not programmed into it. Similarly the 
player cannot jump off a low ledge onto the ground instead of 
running around the prescribed path simply because it would be 
more efficient because this particular game does not allow that.  
More efficient ways of doing things outside of the rule structure 
imposed by the game are simply not available to the players of 
digital games.  The criterion of inefficiency that Suits requires 
through his lusory attitude is a cornerstone of his definition and 
quite simply put, this element is redundant in digital games as no 
alternative exists. 
Thus, if we had to follow Suits’ logic, our inability in a number of 
digital games to voluntarily adopt inefficient means in playing 
them means that we cannot enter into a lusory attitude, and thus 
such activities are not games. Of course, a cheat-code or game 
hack can be used, but by Suits’ own definition these are not within 
the rule-set of the game so engaging them would mean, for Suits, 
that one is not playing a game at all.  
5. PROCESS VS. OBJECT  
As discussed earlier, the primary aim of this paper is to facilitate 
discussions within game studies by providing an analytical 
framework that acknowledges the wide variety of cultural 
artefacts we refer to by the “game” label.  There have been a 
number of debates in the field that have been complicated 
unnecessarily by a lack of agreement upon the exact subject of 
discussion.  The involved parties might be discussing “games” 
without making it clear which members of the family of games 
are actually considered in their analysis.  
One of the fundamental distinctions that have been made when 
discussing games is that between game as object and game as 
process (Cf. Aarseth 2001, 2007).  A board-game like Settlers of 
Catan is both a set of material objects imbued with signs that may 
make sense in and of themselves as well as accruing a more 
specific meaning through the accompanying set of game rules.  
These rules are intended for interpretation and deployment by an 
implied player or group of players and their associated socio-
cultural context.  We can discuss various aspects of the game as 
object in isolation from the actual situated playing of that game.  
In relation to Settlers of Catan, one can comment on the visual 
qualities of the hexagonal board pieces or the colour scheme used 
in its deck of cards.  One may be critical of the value of the robber 
in the game, which blocks players from drawing resources from 
the tile on which it is placed. A genealogy of board-games may 
consider the influence of Settlers of Catan on subsequent board-
game design, and so on.  
This can also be applied to digital games.  The majority of rules 
are coded into the game instead of being upheld by players and 
the material objects involved in its enactment are the software and 
hardware machines that run them instead of physical game pieces, 
but the consideration of the game as a tangible object separate 
from its actualization through player activity remains the same.  
All of these concerns relate to the game as object and although 
they tend to have important implications on the actual game-
session, we need to acknowledge that the subject of our discussion 
is the object and not the process. 
The game as object is always partial or incomplete.  The dormant 
code, board pieces or rule-set present a potential that is actualized 
during game-play; in other words, when a player or players use 
them. 
This brings us to the second perspective: games as process. Social 
theorists like Taylor (2006) and Malaby (2007) have made 
arguments in favour of a processual approach to understanding 
games.  Malaby argues that:  
 One of the first things we must recognize is that games are 
processual.  Each game is an ongoing process.  As it is played 
it always contains the potential for generating new practices 
and new meanings, possibly refiguring the game itself (8). 
The term “processual” refers to the potential for change in every 
engagement with the game and favours a dynamic and recursive 
view of games.  A processual perspective thus presents games as 
ever evolving and socially contingent in a manner consistent with 
other domains of social experience.  The processual nature of 
games also presupposes a ludic perspective from the part of the 
player towards the game object.  One person might look at a set of 
marble chess pieces laid out on a chequered board as an on-going 
game of chess where white’s rooks are threatening the black 
queen in order to subsequently move in on the queen, while 
another individual sees a set of decorative objects and yet another 
a number of solid projectiles on an unattractive black and white 
board.  The last two might have a different perspective on the 
chess set than the first due to a lack of knowledge of chess as a 
game system, or due to the affordances of its pieces to a need they 
have.  Either way, it is only when one takes a game perspective on 
the chess set that a game of chess can proceed.  This distinction 
might sound trivial in the case of chess, since it is such a popular 
game with a widely known rule system, but, as we will see in later 
sections, it is crucial to acknowledge the fact that a thing some 
people call a game might not be a game at all for others. What is 
important to keep in mind is that this ludic perspective is just that: 
a perspective.  It cannot be defined exactly because it is a 
subjective view of what a game is that varies from person to 
person, from culture to culture and across time.  A perspective 
cannot be pinned down with a subjective definition.  It is not 
simply a matter of looking and seeing what a game is, because 
there is nothing to “see”. The qualities of a game shift according 
to the individual or social group that enact its playing.  The game 
is in the seeing, not in the seen.  
This emphasis on game as perspective has particularly strong 
implications for our current understanding of digital games.  The 
objects we call digital games are not games in and of themselves.  
They are software applications that are designed to afford one or 
several simultaneous game perspectives.  Several people can be 
interacting with others on a specific server and a specific map of 
the multiplayer part of a Call of Duty session, with all of them 
playing different concurrent games.  We will delve deeper into 
this below.  Other times individuals may be interacting inside a 
game world without engaging in any aspect of the game, but just 
using its virtual environment as a meeting place or a source of 
great screenshots to print and hang up on their office walls.  
All this does not mean that digital games are some amorphous, 
undefinable mass that is impossible to interpret or comprehend.  
On the contrary, we believe there is a clear way to describe digital 
games that lays out their basic constituent elements and how these 
relate to each other.  Unlike an essentialist or disjunctive 
definition, our description is not static and ahistorical, but 
dynamic.  It does not dictate those characteristics that are specific 
to games and only games, but outlines general elements that are 
present in games and a number of other systems.  What makes any 
of these systems such is, ultimately, the subjective ludic 
perspective taken on it.  This results in a model of games which is 
over-productive, but useful in its inclusiveness.  
6. GAMES AS CYBERMEDIA 
The descriptive model we are proposing here builds upon 
Aarseth’s (1997) cybertext framework which sought to 
conceptualize ergodic (materially dynamic) literature in a more 
accurate manner than the earlier distinctions of digital/non-digital 
and interactive/non-interactive media allowed: 
 The concept of cybertext focuses on the mechanical 
organization of the text, by positing the intricacies of the 
medium as an integral part of the literary exchange.  However, 
it also centers attention on the consumer, or user, of the text, 
as a more integrated figure than even reader-response theorists 
would claim.  The performance of their reader takes place all 
in his head, while the user of cybertext also performs in an 
extranoematic sense…This phenomenon I call ergodic, using 
a term appropriated from physics that derives from the Greek 
words ergon and hodos, meaning “work” and “path”.  In 
ergodic literature, non-trivial effort is required to allow the 
reader to traverse the text (1). 
The non-trivial effort required from the user is an important 
cornerstone of a theoretical model of games. Aarseth also places 
importance on the role of mechanical system at work beneath the 
sign surface. This gives three factors whose interplay yields the 
cybertext: human operator, (verbal) sign and medium. These form 
a matrix where each of the vertices effects and is effected by the 
other two. Although Aarseth included (text) games in the category 
of cybertexts, the aim of the work was not to describe games as a 
specific category, but to demonstrate that the cybertextual 
perspective could be applied to them as prime examples.  
  
Fig. 1: ‘Game’ as perspective on cybermedia objects and processes 
The triadic matrix that Aarseth posits more generally for 
cybertexts will here be expanded into what we are calling a 
descriptive model that includes game phenomena, but also others, 
which we call cybermedia. This over-productiveness is as it 
should be, since we (along with Wittgenstein) don’t believe it is 
possible to build a model that just frames games and nothing else, 
and, if all games are framed, we will inevitably also have caught 
other fish in our net. The model we are proposing here frames a 
more general class of phenomena (cybermedia) to which games 
belong, and is a matrix constituting four elements: the 
representational (or surface) sign, the mechanical system the 
material medium and the player. In so doing we are dividing 
Aarseth’s composite notion of medium as both channel and 
machine into two separate aspects: the material medium and the 
conceptual/mechanical structure. Each of these will be described 
briefly below. 
6.1 Sign  
The first element of the framework, the sign, will here refer to the 
general sense of one or more systems of signification, whether this 
is alphanumeric text, imagery or sound or other expression types. 
Our concept of sign follows general semiotic theory (Eco 1976) 
and refers to the interpretable, “surface” representational elements 
that players read/observe in order to be able to use/play the game.  
6.2 The Mechanical System 
The mechanics corner of the matrix represent the machinic 
operations which structure the process, e.g., to switch from one 
state to another, or simply to change some informational 
condition, great or small.  Any mechanical change that can 
potentially be recognized as such by an observer with sufficient 
access to the system’s informational sphere will have been 
effected by the mechanical system, be it purely informational, or, 
in the case of physical media, a material alteration with processual 
consequences. An example of a mechanically irrelevant change is 
the specific placement of a chess piece within a square. The 
placement of a piece touching two squares, on the other hand, 
would be an illegal move and therefore with processual 
consequences. 
In the case of a mentally upheld process, such as a dual-blind 
chess match, the mechanical system is the shared responsibility of 
the players. In such cases the corners of our model collapses into a 
bipolar dimension of sign – player(s), but the mechanical system 
would still be accessible through player communication.  
 
Fig. 2. World of Warcraft: one sign system, one material 
medium, several mechanical systems. 
The notion of a mechanical system underlying the representational 
sign layer is a crucial component of cybermedia, whether 
biologically, digitally or analogically based.  However, in some 
cases the mechanical system is interchangeable and flexible, while 
it may be the material or semiotic basis that makes us recognize a 
particular cybermedium/game. For instance, World of Warcraft 
has several mechanical systems that are not all active for the same 
player at the same time, but the player may switch between them 
and the activities they define, at will (See figure 2). 
6.3 Material Medium 
The specificity of the material instantiation of the cybermedium, 
the hardware, needs to be taken into consideration.  Even if the 
same semiotic and mechanical system is being discussed, its 
material incarnation on one platform will influence its form and 
experience to varying degrees.  To take a game example, playing 
a real-time strategy game or a first-person shooter using a 
Playstation controller makes for a very different game than 
playing the same title on a PC using a mouse, for example.  
Different types of hardware also allow for different social 
contexts in which cybermedia are used. For example, Nintendo 
DS systems are handheld devices small enough to fit into a jacket 
pocket and easily connected via infra-red ports, permitting a wider 
variety of contexts and thus different experiences, than, say, a 
home PC enables, with a laptop somewhere in-between.  
 
 Fig. 3. Chess: several sign systems, several materialities,  one 
mechanical system. 
We can also consider a second example which highlights the 
relationship between physical and digital cybermedia from the 
world of boardgames. Taking a physical incarnation of The 
Settlers of Catan and its digital port, the importance of materiality 
becomes particularly marked. Although the rules of the game 
remain the same the practice of playing the game is going to be 
different.  The lack of a tangible board laid out on a table, 
resource cards held up by players and game pieces creates a 
markedly different incarnation of Settlers that the model 
importantly accounts for.  Whether this can or should be called a 
different game altogether is less important than having an 
adequate analytical tool to account for the differences.  
6.4 Player 
The above three elements form the matrix of relations that 
describes the cybermedium as object. We express this as the base 
triangle of our pyramid diagram to signify that it can be studied or 
considered in isolation from the user (or player, in the case of 
games), as an artifact. In our nominalist perspective, games are 
those cybermedia objects that users identify as such. Games are 
thus an individual or a group’s perspective on the perception of a 
cybermedia object. It can thus be the case that two individuals 
view the same cybermedia object as both a game and not a game.  
E.g., for some it World of Warcraft is viewed and used as a game, 
while for others, it is a social space.  An individual may change 
their perspective on a cybermedia object, viewing it as a game on 
one occasion and a different form of cybermedium on another. 
Another example is the simulational-literary genre of text 
adventures that emerged in the 1970s. These software applications 
were soon labeled “interactive fiction”, and it was not obvious, at 
the time, that they should be called games. 
We use the term player to refer to the human agent, or agents, that 
engage with those cybermedia objects that are commonly referred 
to as games.  The use of the term “player” should not, however, be 
limited to the characteristics commonly attributed to “play”.  We 
are not here subscribing to a notion of play that prescribes a 
particular experiential disposition, such as “playfulness” (however 
that is conceptualized), to the human agent engaging with the 
game.  We are here using the term “player” instead of “human 
agent” to keep with the convention within game studies to refer to 
the latter with the tag “player”.  
We conceive of the player corner of the matrix as the actual, 
active player that engages with the three other elements described 
above that form the cybermedia object.  
As outlined above, for the object or system to become a game a 
player needs to think of it as such.  That is, she needs to actively 
interpret the activity as a game for it to be considered a game at 
all.  The set of practices she deploys in doing so are always 
considered in relation to the social and cultural contexts of the 
player.  These have an important formative role in the individual’s 
perspective and disposition prior and during engagement with the 
game object. 
In the enactment of the game as process it is often the case that 
different players engaging the same mechanical system, signs and 
material medium have different perspectives on which game they 
are actually playing.  The variation in perspective can come from 
a simple misunderstanding of the rules or a different, self-created 
game, or through a conflicting set of rule-systems and goal 
hierarchies implemented in the actual object itself.  
7. CONCLUSION: Games are Perspectives 
on Cybermedia Objects and Processes 
“Game”, “Play” and “Gameplay” are discursive operations, used 
to point out and mark certain objects and practices in a specific 
way.  To identify the use of the ludic perspective it is enough, for 
us, to know that someone would find a cybermedia phenomenon 
ludic. So instead of a definition of games, we merely have to point 
to a discursive practice whereby a phenomenon in the larger and 
definable category of cybermedia is being tagged as such. 
Whether that phenomenon “really is a game”, is not something we 
can determine, any more than whether the feeling someone 
purports to have is “real love”, “real guilt”, etc.  
Within the category of cybermedia, games are simply those 
members that are cybermedia and referred to, by someone, as 
games. If some phenomena or objects outside this category, e.g. 
love, war, and business, are also referred to as games, they are not 
targeted by our model, since they are not cybermedia. Typically, 
those examples would be seen as games in a metaphorical sense, 
which means that they are, primarily, something else. In addition, 
many objects and phenomena that are not games also belongs to 
the cybermedia category, such as playing an instrument, using a 
word processor to write a text, using Photoshop to modify a 
photograph, marking trees or cattle with a paintball gun, etc. 
Operationally there is no difference; instead, the difference is 
discursive.  They are not games simply because no one labels 
them as games, and only as long as no one does. 
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